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THREE LOST EBOLA FACTS 
AND PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL PREPAREDNESS 
ROBERT GATTER* 
ABSTRACT 
Three key facts about Ebola Transmission should drive policy designed to 
control the risk of transmission during a crisis. 
• Ebola—like HIV—is not easily transmissible human-to-human. 
• Ebola has “dry” and “wet” symptoms, and only the wet symptoms 
threaten public health. 
• A fever is Ebola’s canary in a coal mine; it provides timely warning of a 
coming threat.  
Yet, during the U.S. Ebola scare in 2014, these three facts were lost. 
Unnecessary quarantine, stigma, and burden on those exposed to Ebola 
resulted, including especially for those who volunteered to fight the disease at 
its source abroad. Tragically, the law permitted these injustices because 
lawyers, judges, and legal rules also lost track of these key Ebola facts. Thus, 
public health legal preparedness demands that we do more than clarify relevant 
legal standards; we must also prepare lawyers and judges to better account for 
key infectious disease facts during the next emergency.  
  
 
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University School of 
Law. Thank you to the editors of the Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law and Policy for 
their constant professionalism. This Article is dedicated to MC—artist, scientist, survivor, trail-
blazer, daughter. Thank you especially to Lauren Pair, SLU Law Class of 2019, for her help on this 
Article. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This is a story of a few important facts that got lost during and after the 2014 
Ebola scare in America. Without them, hundreds of people were quarantined 
unnecessarily, and our best-qualified volunteers became reluctant to fight the 
disease at its source where it was growing into an ever-larger global threat. 
Central to this story is a failure of law. Legal standards and procedures 
existed to account for these important facts, but government officials and courts 
did not deploy the law properly. 
The law is not prepared for a public health crisis if lawyers, judges, and 
officials are not ready to preserve key facts. This Article examines missed 
opportunities for the law to get it right, and, in the process, identifies how our 
concept of public health legal preparedness needs to be strengthened. But first—
the three essential facts of Ebola transmission that got lost. 
II.  THREE LOST FACTS ABOUT EBOLA 
Fact #1: Ebola—like HIV—is not easily transmissible human-to-human.  
An uninfected person must directly contact the bodily fluids of an infected 
person. This happens most often when an uninfected person touches the blood, 
vomit, or diarrhea of someone who is in the throes of the illness.1 
Nonetheless, several states acted in 2014 as if Ebola was as easily 
transmitted as the flu. They quarantined individuals who were exposed to, but 
who were not sick with, Ebola.2 To make matters worse, two federal judges 
reviewing the quarantines imposed by officials in two states erroneously 
analogized Ebola transmission to the spread of smallpox, yellow fever, and 
cholera.3 Unlike Ebola, smallpox can be transmitted by coughing and sneezing.4 
 
 1. Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.who.int/en/ 
news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ebola-virus-disease. 
 2. Quarantine by definition is applied only to individuals who are not sick. What Is the 
Difference Between Isolation and Quarantine?, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/answers/public-
health-and-safety/what-is-the-difference-between-isolation-and-quarantine/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services states, 
“Quarantine is used to separate and restrict the movement of well persons who may have been 
exposed to a communicable disease to see if they become ill.” Id. The HHS further explains that 
“[t]hese people may have been exposed to a disease and do not know it, or they may have the 
disease but do not show symptoms.” Id. Meanwhile, “[i]solation is used to separate ill persons who 
have a communicable disease from those who are healthy.” Id. This essay uses each of these terms 
in keeping with these descriptions. 
 3. Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048, 
at *10–11 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017) (analogizing to a case involving the quarantine of a person 
unvaccinated for smallpox who was entering the U.S. from a location where smallpox infections 
were prevalent); Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 592 (D.N.J. 2016). 
 4. How Does Smallpox Spread?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/transmission/index.html (last reviewed June 7, 2016). 
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Also unlike Ebola, yellow fever is spread by mosquitos, which carry it from an 
infected human to an uninfected human as the mosquitos feed.5 And again, 
unlike Ebola, cholera can infect water and food sources and spread to others 
when uninfected individuals drink infected water or eat infected food.6 
Healthy people have a much easier time avoiding Ebola than they do 
avoiding these other diseases. It is easier to avoid another person’s vomit, blood, 
or diarrhea than it is to avoid another person’s cough or sneeze or to avoid 
mosquitos, water, or food. 
The fact that Ebola is transmitted through direct contact with infected bodily 
fluids is well established. Not only is this the mode of transmission reported by 
authoritative public health organizations like the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO),7 but it is also 
borne out in descriptions of Ebola outbreaks dating back to 1976.8 More than 
31,000 humans have been infected with Ebola worldwide since 1976.9 Any 
descriptions of the mode of human-to-human transmissions included with case 
counts are consistent with there being direct contact with the bodily fluids of 
someone very ill with Ebola or who had died recently of the disease.10  
Meanwhile, there are not any accounts of human-to-human transmission of 
Ebola as a result of shaking hands with an infected person or being near an 
infected person who was coughing or sneezing.11 
 
 5. See Transmission of Yellow Fever Virus, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/yellowfever/transmission/index.html (last updated Aug. 13, 2015). 
 6. Cholera – Vibrio Cholerae Infection, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/cholera/general/index.html (last reviewed May 11, 2018). 
 7. Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 1; Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transmission/index.html (last reviewed 
Mar. 12, 2019). 
 8. See generally 40 Years of Ebola Virus Disease Around the World, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/chronology.html (describing all 
human cases and outbreaks of Ebola reported year by year from 1976 through 2018) (last reviewed 
Apr. 3, 2019). 
 9. See id. 
 10. History of Ebola Virus Disease, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/summaries.html (noting in many instances that human-to-
human transmission occurred among caretakers of Ebola patients or bodies of the deceased) (last 
reviewed Sept. 18, 2018). 
 11. Robert Gatter, Ebola, Quarantine, and Flawed CDC Policy, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. R. 375, 
395 (2015). There is a description of one unexplained human-to-human transmission of Ebola in 
1976. See J. Burke, et al., Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever in Zaire, 1976, 56 BULL. WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. 271, 281 (1978). Investigators confirmed that all instances of Ebola transmission involved 
contact between an infected and an uninfected person when the infected person was in the throes 
of the illness except for one, about which investigators concluded that “the only possible source of 
infection was contact with a probable case 48 hours before the latter developed symptoms.” Id. 
This conclusion was reached as scientists and public health workers were still trying to identify and 
understand Ebola, including how it spreads. Given that no other case has been identified since that 
first outbreak in which a mode of transmission other than direct contact with the bodily fluids of an 
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Of course, some scientists—in the name of accuracy—remind us about 
“theoretical” risks of Ebola transmission that have yet to be ruled out through 
the scientific method, even if those risks have not materialized in the field of 
experience. For example, during the 2014 scare, a few Ebola scientists objected 
to the absolute statement that Ebola cannot be transmitted by coughing or 
sneezing.12 One responded, “We can never say never,” and another highlighted 
that no study exists that affirmatively rules out the possibility of Ebola 
transmission by coughing or sneezing.13 
A theoretical risk that cannot be ruled out is not necessarily a risk that we 
must account for. Whether we account for a particular risk depends on its 
significance, and this is true for theoretical risks that we cannot rule out 
definitively. To determine their significance, we must examine them in context. 
For example, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan says he cannot rule out the 
possibility of running for the presidency in the future, even though he has 
announced his retirement from elective politics.14 Meanwhile, Brett Favre at age 
forty-six would not rule out the possibility of coming out of retirement to be the 
backup quarterback in the National Football League (NFL) for the Dallas 
Cowboys.15 Because we can readily place these theoretical events in context, it 
is not difficult to appreciate that the chance of one of these actually happening 
is significant, while the probability of the other one approaches zero. 
Here is some context about the theoretical risk of Ebola spreading through 
coughs and sneezes. As noted above, the number of reported cases of Ebola 
transmission as a result of coughing or sneezing over more than four decades of 
field experience and more than 31,000 recorded cases is zero.16 Reports from 
scientists that they cannot definitively rule-out coughing and sneezing as a mode 
of Ebola transmission must be understood in light of this overwhelming Ebola 
 
infected person, it is quite possible that this one case conclusion is erroneous. Even if not, however, 
it is clearly an aberration as it is only one case that has not been repeated among 31,000 cases and 
over four decades of tracking Ebola. A 1 in 31,000 chance translates to a probability of about three 
one-thousandths of a percent or—written numerically—about 0.003 percent. 
 12. David Willman, Some Ebola Experts Worry Virus May Spread More Easily Than 
Assumed, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ebola-questions-2014 
1007-story.html. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Lindsey McPherson, Citing No Regrets About Retiring, Paul Ryan Bets Kevin McCarthy 
Will Replace Him, ROLL CALL (July 12, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/citing-no-
regrets-retiring-ryan-bets-mccarthy-will-replace (whereby Ryan says, “You never say never to 
such things . . .”). 
 15. See John Breech, Brett Favre’s Willing to Be Cowboys’ Backup QB Under One Absurd 
Condition, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/brett-favres-willing-
to-be-cowboys-backup-qb-under-one-absurd-condition/ (noting Favre “kept a straight face during 
the entire interview, which means he probably seriously contemplated a return for about five 
seconds.”). 
 16. See Gatter, supra note 11. 
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field experience. The lack of even one report of such transmission in 31,000 
cases over forty-two years is fabulously strong evidence that the risk of such 
transmission, if not zero, so closely approaches zero as to be a non-risk in 
practice. Thus, for the purposes of making and deploying law, the risk of Ebola 
transmission from a cough or a sneeze—like the risk of Brett Favre ever 
becoming an NFL quarterback again—should be treated as a non-risk. 
Better than comparing Ebola and Favre is comparing Ebola and the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) on this point. HIV is detectable in the saliva of 
those infected with HIV,17 but a variety of factors combine to make it so unlikely 
for transmission to result from direct contact with the saliva of an HIV-infected 
person that saliva “is not considered a body fluid through which HIV can be 
transmitted.”18 From this, a scientist might conclude that—in theory—saliva is 
a bodily fluid that could transmit HIV because it contains HIV. Yet, in practice, 
public health professionals do not identify coughing or sneezing as a mode of 
HIV transmission; the public does not generally worry that a person with HIV 
will transmit the virus by coughing or sneezing; and the government does not 
take any official action to prevent the transmission of HIV via a cough or a 
sneeze.19 Similarly, individuals and governments should not act as if Ebola can 
be transmitted in any way other than through direct contact with bodily fluids 
and should not act as if Ebola is like diseases communicated between humans 
by any other means. 
Fact #2: Ebola has “dry” and “wet” symptoms, and only the wet symptoms 
threaten public health.  
The “wet symptoms” are those that include a bodily fluid exiting the infected 
person—bleeding, coughing up blood, vomiting, and diarrhea.20 These bodily 
fluids are contaminated with the Ebola virus, and it is direct contact with these 
bodily fluids that poses a substantial risk of transmission of the disease to an 
uninfected person.21 That is why the vast majority of those infected with Ebola 
 
 17. Stephanie A. Freel et al., Characterization of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 in 
Saliva and Blood Plasma by V3-Specific Heteroduplex Tracking Assay and Genotype Analyses, 75 
J. VIROLOGY 4936, 4936 (2001). 
 18. Saliva, AIDSMAP (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.aidsmap.com/Saliva/page/1322841/. 
 19. See, e.g., Karen Klinka, AIDS, Virus Not Transmitted Like Common Cold, Flu Health 
Officials Dispel Misconceptions About Disease, OKLAHOMAN (Nov. 12, 1991), https://newsok.com 
/article/2375050/aids-virus-not-transmitted-like-common-cold-flu-health-officials-dispel-miscon 
ceptions-about-disease. 
 20. Frequently Asked Questions On Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/faq-ebola/en/ (last updated May 2017); Gustavo E. 
Velásquez et al., Time From Infection to Disease and Infectiousness for Ebola Virus Disease, A 
Systematic Review, 61 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1135, 1135 (2015). 
 21. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), supra note 7. 
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are individuals who either (1) cared for someone with Ebola experiencing wet 
symptoms or (2) prepared someone for burial who died from Ebola.22 
Yet, Ebola also has “dry symptoms”—fever, headache, body aches, and 
nausea—that, by their nature, do not involve any bodily fluids.23 Because 
human-to-human transmission of Ebola results from direct contact with infected 
bodily fluids,24 and because Ebola’s dry symptoms do not include the release of 
infected bodily fluids,25 it stands to reason that a person with Ebola who is 
experiencing only dry symptoms does not pose a significant risk of transmitting 
the disease to others nearby. 
Ignoring the distinction between Ebola’s wet and dry symptoms leads to 
confusion and fear of the wrong symptoms and the wrong people. Consider the 
case of Dr. Craig Spencer. He was exposed to Ebola as a Doctors-Without- 
Borders volunteer while treating Ebola patients in Guinea in 2014.26 As a 
volunteer, he wore protective equipment to treat those patients.27 When Dr. 
Spencer returned to his home in New York City in mid-October 2014, he 
followed the self-monitoring guidelines for those exposed to Ebola, which were 
then in use by Doctors-Without-Borders and consistent with recommendations 
of the CDC.28 The guidelines instructed him to take his temperature twice 
daily,29 and he paid attention to any feelings of nausea, headache, or malaise.30 
For several days his temperature was normal, and he felt fine.31 When he 
recorded a raised temperature on his sixth day at home, he followed the 
instructions he had been given and called Doctors-Without-Borders, which in 
turn contacted New York’s public health officials, who promptly placed him into 
isolation at Bellevue Hospital based on his dry symptoms.32 Only after Dr. 
Spencer was in isolation in a hospital did he begin experiencing Ebola’s wet 
symptoms that pose a significant risk of transmission to others.33 He received 
supportive care in isolation while his body fought the infection, and he 
 
 22. Frequently Asked Questions On Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 20. 
 23. Id.; Velásquez et al., supra note 20. 
 24. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), supra note 7. 
 25. See Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 1. 
 26. Sydney Lupkin, Ebola in America: Timeline of the Deadly Virus, ABCNEWS (Nov. 17, 
2014), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/ebola-america-timeline/story?id=26159719. 
 27. Craig Spencer, Having and Fighting Ebola – Public Health Lessons from a Clinician 
Turned Patient, 372 N. ENG. J. MED. 1089, 1090 (2015). 
 28. Sydney Lupkin, New Jersey, New York, Illinois, Toughen Ebola Quarantine Rules After 
Doctor Case, ABCNEWS (Oct. 24, 2014), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/york-doctorebola-%20 
quarantine/story?id=26431431. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Spencer, supra note 27. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Lupkin, supra note 28. 
 33. See Spencer, supra note 27. 
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survived.34 Because Dr. Spencer  only experienced dry symptoms prior to his 
isolation from others, and because Ebola’s dry symptoms—fever, body aches, 
headache, nausea, and malaise—do not pose a risk of transmitting the disease to 
others, Dr. Spencer did not put others at risk for Ebola. 
To the public at large, however, Dr. Spencer was a villain for riding the New 
York subway and going out in public during the several days after he returned 
home and before he was hospitalized when, unbeknownst to anyone, he was 
infected with Ebola.35 To them, Dr. Spencer’s conduct was reckless because—
as it happened—he could become symptomatic at any time and media outlets 
and health officials explained that, while asymptomatic individuals cannot 
spread Ebola, those experiencing symptoms can.36 Here is what a physician said 
in his role as the ABC News Chief Health and Medical Editor: “Ebola is 
contagious when someone is symptomatic, [ ]. A fever is the first symptom of 
Ebola, which means the virus is beginning to multiply in the patient’s blood 
when a fever sets in . . . . Ebola is spread through close contact with an infected 
person, and it’s not airborne.”37 This physician made no distinction between 
Ebola’s dry and wet symptoms and thus no distinction between the virtually zero 
risk of transmission posed by dry symptoms and the significant risk of 
transmission posed by wet symptoms. Instead, he links the risk of transmission 
to being “symptomatic,” identifies “a fever as the first symptom,” and says that 
transmission results from “close contact” with an “infected” person.38 Unless a 
person hearing this report knows more about Ebola, she would be left with the 
erroneous impression that there is a significant risk of Ebola transmission if she 
gets close to a person whose only symptom is a fever. 
Missing the distinction between Ebola’s relatively benign dry symptoms and 
its quite dangerous wet symptoms was huge. Not only was it the difference 
between treating Dr. Spencer as a villain rather than a hero, it triggered an 
unfounded and draconian change in the quarantine policies of several states. The 
day after the news broke that Spencer experienced a fever and was isolated, New 
Jersey, New York, and Illinois announced new policies under which 
asymptomatic individuals exposed to Ebola would be quarantined.39 
 
 34. See id. 
 35. Lupkin, supra note 28. 
 36. Odds of Catching Ebola on the Subway and Other Handy Facts, ABC NEWS (Oct. 24, 
2014), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/odds-catching-ebola-subway-handy-facts/story?id=262820 
17. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Lupkin, supra note 28. 
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Fact #3: A fever is Ebola’s canary in a coalmine; it provides timely warning 
of a coming threat.  
If a person exposed to Ebola is, in fact, infected with the disease, she will 
experience non-infectious, dry symptoms for several days prior to the onset of 
infectious, wet symptoms.40 Thus, the onset of dry symptoms in a person 
exposed to Ebola is useful to public health officials; it signals that it is time to 
isolate this person and, given the delay between the onset of dry and wet 
symptoms, officials have time to move the person into isolation without 
endangering others.  
An experienced infectious disease specialist who treated Ebola patients in 
West Africa in 2014 and 2015 wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine 
about the risk of transmission that infected public health workers might present 
to others.41 He said, “[W]e now know that fever precedes the contagious stage, 
allowing workers who are unknowingly infected to identify themselves before 
they become a threat to their community.”42 A systematic review lends empirical 
support for this claim. The review mined published Ebola studies for case 
accounts that distinguished between the onset of dry and wet symptoms, found 
a dozen such accounts, and from that, surmised that dry symptoms precede wet 
symptoms by an average of six days.43 The authors also provided the following 
timeline for the progression of the disease.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Spencer’s experience follows this timeline, and it demonstrates that 
health officials relied on the dry symptoms as an indicator that it was time to 
isolate him before he experienced the wet symptoms that posed a significant risk 
 
 40. Velásquez et al., supra note 20, at 1139 (reviewing available case reports that distinguish 
between the onset of dry and wet symptoms and concluding that dry symptoms precede wet 
symptoms by an average of six days). 
 41. Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Ebola and Quarantine, 371 N. ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2029 (2014). 
 42. Id. (emphasis added). 
 43. Velásquez et al., supra note 20, at 1139. 
 44. Id. at 1138 fig.1. 
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of transmission to others. We can track his story from left to right across the 
timeline of Ebola’s symptoms and infectiousness, above.45 
Dr. Spencer was infected with Ebola sometime during his deployment to 
West Africa.46 Following the timeline, above, Spencer not only entered the 
“incubation period” at the time of his infection, but also the “latent period” in 
the sense that he was infected with Ebola but not yet infectious to others. During 
the “incubation period,” he re-entered the U.S. and was out and about in his 
hometown of New York City before experiencing any symptoms, dry or wet.47 
Then, several days after returning home, he developed a fever.48 According to 
the timeline, that marked the end of his “incubation period,” because he 
experienced dry symptoms of Ebola. Importantly, however, Spencer remained 
in the “latent period” of Ebola’s progression because—experiencing only dry 
symptoms that are not a mode of transmitting the disease—Spencer was not yet 
infectious to others.49 At this stage, Spencer reported his condition to public 
health authorities, who promptly isolated him in anticipation of the next stage of 
his illness—the wet symptoms—that would pose a significant risk of 
transmission of Ebola to others.50 Dr. Spencer left the “latent period” and entered 
the “infectious period” when he experienced the first wet symptoms, which was 
after he had been isolated in a special unit in a hospital.51 
Again, the progression of Ebola in Dr. Spencer’s case—including the 
several days delay between spiking a fever and experiencing the very first of the 
wet symptoms—was typical.  Thus, a fever or other dry symptom, when 
experienced by a person who has been exposed to Ebola, is a reliable, non-
infectious signal that the person will soon experience symptoms that pose a 
significant risk of disease transmission to others.52 Consequently, public 
officials must acknowledge, teach, and defend that Ebola’s fever is a warning, 
not a threat. 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Lisa Schnirring, Ebola Confirmed in NYC Doctor as WHO Warns About Mali, CTR. 
FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. AND POL’Y (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-per 
spective/2014/10/ebola-confirmed-nyc-doctor-who-warns-about-mali (describing Spencer’s 
infection as “linked to exposure in West Africa.”). 
 47. See id. (noting that Spencer was screened by authorities at the airport when he re-entered 
the U.S.); see also Helen Ouyang, The Doctor Who Got Ebola, N.Y. MAG. (June 7, 2015), http://ny 
mag.com/intelligencer/2015/06/craig-spencer-after-ebola.html?gtm=top&gtm=bottom. 
 48. Ouyang, supra note 47. 
 49. Velásquez et al., supra note 20, at 1138 fig.1. 
 50. Ouyang, supra note 47. 
 51. Velásquez et al., supra note 20, at 1138 fig.1; Ouyang, supra note 47. 
 52. See Velásquez et al., supra note 20, at 1139 (reviewing available case reports that 
distinguish between the onset of dry and wet symptoms and concluding that dry symptoms precede 
wet symptoms by an average of six days). Drazen et al., supra note 41. 
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Officials failed to do this in 201453 and continue this failure today. For 
example, the CDC’s official explanation of Ebola transmission does not even 
distinguish between Ebola’s dry and wet symptoms, let alone explain that 
Ebola’s dry symptoms provide a non-infectious warning to move a person into 
isolation while there is still time to do so prior to the onset of the infectious 
symptoms.54 About Ebola transmission, the CDC says: “[t]he Ebola virus 
CANNOT spread to others until a person develops signs or symptoms of 
[Ebola].”55 The phrase “signs or symptoms” is then linked to a single list of all 
Ebola symptoms dry and wet, fever and bleeding.56 
If the CDC—the nation’s foremost public health agency—does not explain 
that a fever is the canary in Ebola’s coal mine, then we should not be surprised 
when that fact goes unacknowledged by others when making critical public 
health decisions. Indeed, this may explain why, at the peak of the Ebola scare, 
the CDC issued guidance that invited state health officials to quarantine 
asymptomatic individuals who had been exposed to Ebola.57 It may also explain 
why several states, in late October 2014, adopted policies to quarantine even 
asymptomatic individuals who had recently traveled to a country where Ebola 
was widespread.58 And it might also explain why two federal district courts, well 
after the scare had subsided, dismissed the lawsuits of several individuals who 
returned to or visited the U.S. from affected West African nations and who were 
quarantined in New Jersey and Connecticut even though they did not have even 
the dry symptoms of Ebola.59 
Consider, for example, the ruling of the federal district court in Connecticut 
in a lawsuit brought by a class of quarantined individuals, which included a 
Liberian family that had traveled to Connecticut to visit relatives in October 
2014, never experienced any symptoms of Ebola, and yet were quarantined by 
 
 53. In late October 2014, when Craig Spencer developed a fever and was isolated, the CDC’s 
website said of human-to-human transmission that, “You can only get Ebola from the body fluids 
of a person who is sick with or has died from Ebola . . . “ without defining what it means to be “sick 
with” Ebola. Facts About Ebola in the U.S., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/infographic.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2019). 
 54. See Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), supra note 7; Signs and Symptoms, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/symptoms/index.html (last reviewed 
May 22, 2018). 
 55. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), supra note 7 (emphasis in original). 
 56. Signs and Symptoms, supra note 54. 
 57. See Notes on the Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with 
Potential Ebola Virus Exposure, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc. 
gov/vhf/ebola/exposure/monitoring-and-movement-of-persons-with-exposure.html (last updated 
Dec. 27, 2017); see also Gatter, supra note 11, at 377. 
 58. See Lupkin, supra note 28; Gatter, supra note 11, at 394. 
 59. Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048, 
at *3–4, *14 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017); Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584, 586 (D.N.J. 
2016). 
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Connecticut officials in the basement of their relative’s home for twenty-one 
days.60 In 2016, well after the U.S. Ebola scare had ended, the class sued 
Connecticut’s governor seeking damages under § 1983.61 The federal district 
court dismissed the claim, holding that state officials were protected by qualified 
immunity because, according to the court, the state’s quarantine was 
reasonable.62 
The court’s opinion demonstrates the irrationality that results when the 
distinction between Ebola’s dry and wet symptoms is lost along with the fact 
that the dry symptoms provide a reliable warning that it is time to isolate the 
infected person prior to the onset of the wet symptoms that pose a significant 
threat to others. To justify the state’s decision to quarantine individuals who 
traveled to Connecticut from a West African nation where Ebola was 
widespread, the court erroneously assumed that all of Ebola’s symptoms 
threaten others and that those symptoms could arise without any warning, as 
demonstrated by this passage in the court’s opinion:  
While asymptomatic individuals cannot transmit Ebola, quarantining an 
individual during the incubation period is not arbitrary; it is substantially related 
to preventing any potential transmission of a highly infectious illness. For 
instance, an asymptomatic individual could potentially become symptomatic 
during the incubation period and then transmit the illness to others prior to 
being isolated.63 
The court is simply wrong. Quarantining someone exposed to Ebola to protect 
others from the risk of transmission posed by Ebola’s first symptoms is 
quintessentially arbitrary because Ebola’s first symptoms—the dry symptoms—
do not pose a significant risk of transmission.64 Even if the court was referring 
to wet symptoms in this passage, it failed to account for the fact that dry 
symptoms will precede wet symptoms and thereby warn officials that the wet 
symptoms will begin several days later,65 which is plenty of time to isolate the 
exposed patient. 
 
 60. Liberian Cmty Ass’n of Conn, 2017 WL 4897048, at *5; Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584. 
 61. Liberian Cmty Ass’n of Conn, 2017 WL 4897048, at *1. 
 62. Id. at *14. 
 63. Id. at *11 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 64. See supra notes 20–39 and accompanying text; Velásquez et al., supra note 20 (generally 
establishing that Ebola’s dry symptoms occur during the “latent period” and prior to the “infectious 
period” of the disease). 
 65. Velásquez et al., supra note 20, at 1139 (reviewing available case reports that distinguish 
between the onset of dry and wet symptoms and concluding that dry symptoms precede wet 
symptoms by an average of six days); Drazen et al., supra note 41. 
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III.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF LOSING THESE THREE KEY FACTS ABOUT EBOLA 
TRANSMISSION 
Part II identified the following three facts about Ebola transmission. 
• Ebola is not easily transmitted; like HIV, it requires direct contact with 
the bodily fluids of a person suffering Ebola’s wet symptoms.66 
• The dry symptoms of Ebola—a fever, for example—do not pose a risk of 
transmission.67 
• Ebola’s dry symptoms occur days before the dangerous wet symptoms, 
giving officials time to isolate the patient before there is a significant risk 
to others.68 
Because health officials, lawyers, and judges did not sufficiently articulate 
and defend these facts during the 2014 Ebola scare in the U.S., they were lost. 
And the consequences were grave. According to a report by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Yale Global Health Justice Partnership, states 
formally quarantined or informally coerced into self-quarantine at least 273 
asymptomatic individuals whom officials suspected had been exposed to 
Ebola.69  Many were health professionals who had volunteered to fight Ebola 
abroad so as to prevent its spreading farther.70 
There is evidence that government policies to order every public health 
worker returning from fighting Ebola abroad into a three-week quarantine 
chilled volunteerism among aid workers in 2014. Doctors-Without-Borders—
faced with the prospect of losing volunteers who could not afford the additional 
time away from their homes and jobs—reduced the length of their volunteers’ 
deployments by three weeks to account for the prospect of quarantine.71 Other 
medical aid organizations had difficulty recruiting volunteers after these state 
 
 66. See supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text. 
 67. See supra notes 20–39 and accompanying text. 
 68. See supra notes 40–64 and accompanying text. 
 69. AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION & YALE GLOB. HEALTH JUSTICE P’SHIP, FEAR, POLITICS, 
AND EBOLA: HOW QUARANTINES HURT THE FIGHT AGAINST EBOLA AND VIOLATE THE 
CONSTITUTION 29 (2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu-ebolare 
port.pdf [hereinafter ACLU Report].The report notes that the actual count is likely much higher 
because many quarantines took place informally and because states have been secretive about such 
quarantines. Id. at 28–29. 
 70. See id. at 19, 25–27 (identifying that state Ebola quarantine policies were specifically 
aimed at returning health care workers and describing the experiences of three physicians in 
particular). 
 71. Jonathan Allen, U.S. Quarantines ‘Chilling’ Ebola Fight in West Africa: MSF, REUTERS 
(Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ebola-usa-msf/u-s-quarantines-chilling-
ebola-fight-in-west-africa-msf-idUSKBN0IJ2PR20141031; see also ACLU Report, supra note 69, 
at 31. 
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policies were announced in October 2014, with one experiencing a twenty-five 
percent reduction in its volunteer work force.72 
When volunteerism dropped in early November 2014, Ebola in three West 
African nations posed a tremendous global threat. The WHO declared a 
worldwide public health emergency only three months before in August.73 The 
first of the three affected West African countries would not be declared Ebola-
free until May 2015,74 and it would be another thirteen months before WHO 
would declare the emergency over.75 When volunteerism first dropped, there 
had been 13,241 Ebola infections and 4,950 deaths to that point in the epidemic, 
but these numbers would more than double before the epidemic’s end, 
ballooning to 28,616 confirmed infections and 11,310 deaths.76 We will never 
know how many of these infections and deaths would have been prevented had 
state quarantine policies not diminished the volunteer public health workforce. 
In short, the moment when several states announced that they would 
quarantine everyone traveling to the U.S. from Liberia, Guinea, or Sierra Leone 
with or without symptoms of Ebola was the worst time to do so. When the U.S. 
is threatened by a growing epidemic in another part of the world, our policy 
should be to encourage greater volunteerism among public health and medical 
professionals. Like fighting a fire, the strategy for fighting the spread of a 
dangerous infectious disease is to mount a global response where the disease 
flares so as to contain it and prevent its spreading.77 Announcing a policy of 
post-deployment quarantine for all returning people who volunteer to fight a 
large Ebola flare-up abroad will diminish the workforce available to contain the 
disease, which in turn, will give the epidemic a better opportunity to turn into a 
pandemic. 
Losing these key facts about Ebola transmission also opened the door to the 
most invidious forms of discrimination.78 For example, Nigerian students who 
applied to a community college in Texas were rejected in letters stating that the 
college was “not accepting international students from countries with confirmed 
 
 72. ACLU Report, supra note 69, at 31. 
 73. Statement On the 1st meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee On the 2014 Ebola 
Outbreak in West Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.who.int/mediacentre/ 
news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/. 
 74. The Ebola Outbreak in Liberia is Over, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 9, 2015), 
https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/liberia-ends-ebola/en/. 
 75. Situation Report: Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 10, 2016), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/208883/ebolasitrep_10Jun2016_eng.pdf?se 
quence=1. 
 76. Case Counts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ 
ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/case-counts.html (last reviewed Mar. 8, 2019). 
 77. See ACLU Report, supra note 69, at 10. 
 78. Gatter, supra note 11, at 398; see ACLU Report, supra note 69, at 29–30. 
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Ebola cases.” 79 This happened despite the fact that there had been at least one 
confirmed case of Ebola in the U.S. at the time the college wrote its rejection 
letters.80 In another example, Senegalese-American children in New York City 
were beaten and taunted by their school classmates, who yelled “Ebola!” while 
hitting them.81 In still other instances, the spouses and children of health 
professionals and government officials who traveled to West Africa were not 
permitted to go to work or attend school for fear that they had caught Ebola at 
home and could spread it in school or at work.82 
The irrational actions officials took and that courts failed to remedy when 
these three facts were lost may have signaled erroneously to the rest of society 
that someone exposed to Ebola, potentially exposed to Ebola, or who lives with 
someone who may have been exposed to Ebola poses a real threat to everyone. 
When the law permits irrational actions that contravene the scientific facts of 
Ebola transmission, it should not surprise us that schools, employers, co-
workers, business owners, and neighbors follow the law’s lead. 
Finally, a consequence of losing these key facts about Ebola transmission is 
bad legal precedent and erosion of what constitutes reasonable action by public 
health agencies. As referenced in Part II, two federal lawsuits were filed after 
the 2014 Ebola scare that sought compensation for the unjustified quarantine of 
a nurse in New Jersey and a family from Liberia that was visiting Connecticut 
on a visa.83 Each case was brought under § 1983 against a state governor and 
state public health officials.84 In each case, the defendants filed motions to 
dismiss based on qualified immunity, and each federal court granted those 
motions.85 In so doing, the federal district courts in New Jersey and Connecticut 
ruled on the basis of just a few federal opinions addressing the constitutionality 
of quarantine, none of which involved Ebola.86 From those cases, the federal 
district courts in New Jersey and Connecticut concluded that public health 
officials need only act reasonably and that it is reasonable to quarantine a person 
 
 79. Texas College Rejects Nigerian Applicants, Cites Ebola Cases, NBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 
2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/texas-college-rejects-nigerian-ap 
plicants-cites-ebola-cases-n226291. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Elizabeth Barber, 2 Kids from Senegal Were Beaten Up in NYC by Classmates Yelling 
‘Ebola’, TIME (Oct. 27, 2014), http://time.com/3542955/senegalkids-brothers-assaulted-ebola-
bronx -tremont-school-new-york-city-pabe-amadou-drame/. 
 82. Anemona Hartocollis & Nate Schweber, Bellevue Employees Face Ebola at Work, and 
Stigma of It Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/ny 
region/bellevue-workers-worn-out-from-treating-ebola-patient-face-stigma-outside-hospital.html. 
 83. Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584 (D.N.J. 2016); Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. 
v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048, at *1, *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017). 
 84. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *1. 
 85. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *1. 
 86. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 590–92; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at 
*10. 
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exposed to a dangerous infectious disease for the duration of the disease’s 
incubation period.87 Because each of the two lawsuits concerned individuals 
who were exposed or at least potentially exposed to Ebola and quarantine orders 
that limited quarantine to Ebola’s incubation period, the courts concluded the 
defendant-officials had acted reasonably and were immune from suit for 
compensation.88 
Even assuming that the courts adopted the right standard, their application 
of it stripped the “reason” right out of “reasonableness.” Each court was content 
to treat all infectious diseases as similarly dangerous without taking account for 
the different ways diseases are transmitted from person to person.89 Neither 
court accounted for the modes of Ebola transmission.90 As a result, neither court 
could possibly determine what governmental actions are or are not based on 
reason. And now these two opinions are themselves precedent for future courts 
and cases. In this way, a consequence of Ebola’s lost facts is that 
“reasonableness” is less likely to be treated as a meaningful check on public 
health action in the face of an infectious disease. 
IV.  HOW DID THE KEY FACTS ABOUT EBOLA TRANSMISSION GET LOST? 
As explored next, the 2014 Ebola scare and its legal aftermath demonstrate 
that we were not prepared to deploy the law effectively in the face of public fear. 
This part examines evidence that lawyers and judges were not prepared to deploy 
the law quickly so as to more effectively protect those injured by unnecessary 
quarantine, to discipline state officials who violate the law while attempting to 
protect the public’s health, or to establish valuable precedent. 
While public fear of an ongoing outbreak likely caused officials in 2014 to 
ignore the facts of Ebola transmission when adopting and enforcing policies to 
quarantine individuals returning from countries where Ebola was widespread,91 
such fear could not have been at play when two federal courts—years after the 
scare had ended—addressed two lawsuits brought by those who had been 
quarantined.92 Rather, the failure of these courts to account for these facts must 
 
 87. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 593; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *12. 
 88. See Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 593; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at 
*9. 
 89. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 590–92 (relying on case law involving smallpox and a venereal 
disease); Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *10 (analogizing to case law 
involving smallpox). 
 90. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 590–92; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at 
*10. 
 91. Wendy E. Parmet & Michael S. Sinha, A Panic Foretold: Ebola in the United States, 27 
CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 148, 152 (2017); Gatter, supra note 11; ACLU Report, supra note 68, at 
25–27. 
 92. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *1. 
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have resulted from other factors, including the strategies used by the lawyers 
representing the plaintiffs.93 
Lawyers for individuals unjustifiably quarantined in Connecticut and New 
Jersey during the 2014 Ebola scare sued state officials in those states seeking 
compensation under § 1983 for federal constitutional violations.94 Claims for 
civil damages under § 1983 are subject to the defense of qualified immunity.95 
Predictably, the officials from Connecticut and New Jersey who were named as 
defendants in those two lawsuits filed motions to dismiss based on their claimed 
qualified immunity.96 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government 
officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.’”97 For a time, the Supreme Court of the United States 
required that a court addressing the defense of qualified immunity must 
determine first whether the official had violated a right of the plaintiff’s that was 
guaranteed by federal law; if so, then a court must determine also whether the 
violated statutory or constitutional right was clearly established and whether it 
was a right about which a reasonable person would have known at the time the 
official violated it.98 More recently, however, the Supreme Court receded from 
this position, ruling instead that a reviewing court, at its discretion, may make 
these two determinations in either order.99 
Thus, by suing for money damages under § 1983, lawyers for the individuals 
formerly quarantined by the States of Connecticut and New Jersey subjected 
their clients to two related risks. First is the general risk that the defendants 
would escape liability based on a qualified immunity defense. Second is the risk 
that the reviewing courts, rather than judge whether the defendants violated the 
constitutional rights of their clients, would address whether any constitutional 
right the defendants may have violated was “clearly established” and was a right 
about which a “reasonable person would know” at the time of the alleged 
violation. 
This second risk was particularly relevant to lawsuits alleging that 
quarantines in 2014 were unconstitutional, because the controlling legal 
 
 93. This Article is critical of the strategies adopted by the lawyers representing the plaintiffs 
in Hickox v Christie and Liberian Community Association of Connecticut v. Malloy based on the 
public policy of legal standards and practices that force health officials and courts to account for 
the various modes of transmission of different infectious diseases. This article does not question 
that the lawyers representing the quarantined plaintiffs served their clients loyally, professionally, 
and in ways that met the relevant standard of care. 
 94. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *1. 
 95. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009). 
 96. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584, 593; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, 
at *1. 
 97. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818(1982)). 
 98. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001). 
 99. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 
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standard was uncertain. Very few published federal court opinions existed then 
(and now) addressing the constitutionality of quarantine orders.100 With so few 
data points from which to construct a bright-line rule about how broad 
constitutional principles apply to quarantine, a court is more easily justified in 
reaching the conclusion that any constitutional right is under developed or 
ambiguous and thus neither “clearly established” nor a right that a “reasonable 
person would have known.”101 Moreover, courts must account for the 1905 
Supreme Court holding in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,102 and they have taken 
different positions on whether state quarantine orders are assessed under modern 
substantive due process jurisprudence or whether they are subject to a 
“reasonableness” standard unique to public health actions.103 A court can take 
these differing positions as additional evidence that the right to be free of 
quarantine is somewhat unsettled and thus neither “clearly established” nor 
something about which a “reasonable person would have known.”104 
Other options existed during and after the U.S. Ebola scare for challenging 
the legality of Connecticut’s and New Jersey’s quarantine of asymptomatic 
individuals, including suing for damages under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973105 
and seeking judicial review under administrative law of the quarantine while it 
was ongoing.106 These would have triggered more rigorous legal standards than 
those available under the federal constitution, which would reduce the likelihood 
that the key facts of Ebola transmission would get lost. 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits disability 
discrimination.107 It provides: “No otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability . . . shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, . . . be subjected to 
discrimination . . . under any program or activity conducted by any Executive 
 
 100. Indeed, the Hickox and Liberian Cmty. Ass’n Courts’ opinions each describe those handful 
of cases and thereby exhaust the federal case law on point. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 590–92; 
Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *10. 
 101. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (explaining the requirements for the qualified immunity 
defense). 
 102. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 27–28 (1905) (upholding the requirement that individuals 
be vaccinated against smallpox on the grounds that it is reasonable action by public health 
authorities). 
 103. Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL. L. R. 933, 
960–70 (1989) (examining the different interpretations that courts and commentators have given to 
the Supreme Court’s application of the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution in 1905 opinion Jacobson v. Massachusetts, because the opinion pre-dates the 
development of modern substantive due process jurisprudence). 
 104. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (explaining the requirements for the qualified immunity 
defense). 
 105. See infra notes 106–113 and accompanying text. 
 106. See infra notes 114–116 and accompanying text. 
 107. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). 
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agency . . .” which is defined to include all state administrative agencies.108 
Additionally, it has been deemed to create a private right of action for damages 
for those who are victims of intentional discrimination.109 Most notably, the 
Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline held that § 504 
applies to actions taken against individuals who have or who are perceived to 
have a contagious disease.110 In such cases, courts must include findings of fact: 
based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge, 
about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration 
of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what 
is the potential harm to third parties), and (d) the probabilities the disease will 
be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.111 
The Court’s specificity in describing the findings that a court must make 
when ruling on whether a state agency discriminates against a person perceived 
to have a contagious disease could have helped assure that a court accounts for 
the facts about Ebola’s mode of transmission and the relationship between 
Ebola’s infectious period and its wet and dry symptoms. Lawyers for the New 
Jersey plaintiff did not include a claim based on § 504 in their complaint.112 
While the complaint in the suit challenging Connecticut’s quarantine of 
asymptomatic individuals included a claim for disability discrimination under § 
504,113 the claim was pled incorrectly and dismissed despite efforts of the 
 
 108. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (b)(1)(A). 
 109. “The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
. . . shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal 
assistance or Federal provider of such assistant under section 794 of this title.” 29 U.S.C. § 
794a(a)(2). The public health agencies of both Connecticut and New Jersey are recipients of federal 
assistance. ASS’N OF ST. & TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, ASTHO PROFILE OF STATE AND 
TERRITORIAL PUBLIC HEALTH 132, 162 (2017), http://www.astho.org/Profile/Volume-Four/2016-
ASTHO-Profile-of-State-and-Territorial-Public-Health/. Additionally, U.S. Department of Justice 
guidance states that monetary damages are available to individuals who are victims of intentional 
discrimination under Title VI. Section IX- Private Right of Action & Individual Relief Through 
Agency Action, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/T6Manual9 (last updated Jan. 26, 
2017). Thus, individuals in Connecticut or New Jersey ordered into quarantine in a manner that 
violates the Rehabilitation Act’s prohibition against disability discrimination may sue for monetary 
damages so long as they claim the disability discrimination was intentional. 
 110. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282, 289 (1987) (§ 504 applies to a public 
school board’s firing of a teacher with remitting and relapsing tuberculosis because a person with 
a contagious disease is “handicapped” under the statute; the case was remanded to district court for 
findings of fact relevant to whether the teacher was “otherwise qualified” to teach in the classroom). 
 111. Id. at 288 (emphasis added). The Court went on to say, “In making these findings, courts 
normally should defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials.” Id. 
 112. Verified Complaint at 28–33, Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 578 (D.N.J. 2016) (No. 
15-7647). 
 113. Trial Pleading at 43–45, Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-
00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017). 
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plaintiffs’ lawyers to amend the complaint belatedly through its brief on the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.114 
In some instances, lawyers representing asymptomatic individuals subject 
to a quarantine order might also take advantage of a so-called “hard look” 
standard for judicial review of agency actions. Under the federal Administrative 
Procedures Act, a court may set aside an agency action—including a quarantine 
order—if the action is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.115 When 
applied to a federal agency’s discretionary actions, this standard of review is 
relatively rigorous. While a court may not substitute its own judgment for that 
of the agency, the court must take a hard look at the logic used by the agency 
and assure that it is rational.116 The hard look is intended to be a “thorough, 
probing, in-depth review” of the agency’s decision, which requires the reviewing 
court to assure that the agency rationally addressed every relevant factor and did 
not make a clear error of judgment in reaching its conclusion.117 Where a hard-
look standard of review is available, a lawyer could use it to challenge a public 
health agency’s judgment that an asymptomatic individual exposed to Ebola 
poses a significant risk of communicating the disease to others. In particular, 
those individuals could argue that, in order to account for every relevant factor 
in an in-depth and probing manner, a court must assess whether the agency 
considered each of the key facts about Ebola transmission when reaching its 
judgment. 
Of course, the quarantine orders at issue in the Connecticut and New Jersey 
cases were issued by state—not federal—agencies.118 Consequently, lawyers for 
the quarantined individuals would have needed to identify the relevant state law 
analog to the federal hard-look review.119 A challenge of the New Jersey 
quarantine order based on such a standard of review may have been available, 
because the state Supreme Court has recognized judicial authority to set aside 
agency actions where “the agency clearly erred by reaching a conclusion that 
could not reasonably have been made upon a showing of the relevant factors.”120 
Yet, there is significant variation among states as to the rigor applied by courts 
 
 114. Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *11 n.23. 
 115. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 116. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–16 (1971). This test 
is informally known as the “hard look” standard of review. MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. 
LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 592 (3d ed. 2009). 
 117. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415–16. 
 118. Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 578, 586–87 (D.N.J. 2016); Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of 
Conn., 2017 WL 4897048, at *4–5. 
 119. Hard look review might be available in Connecticut. Envirotest Sys. Corp. v. Freedom of 
Info. Comm’n, 757 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Conn. App. 2000) (explaining discretionary judgments of 
administrative agencies are given considerable weight by courts). 
 120. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 501 A.2d 125, 129 (N.J. 
1985). 
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reviewing discretionary state agency actions.121 Some state standards of review 
are quite deferential, while others have come closer to mimicking the federal 
hard-look probe.122 
Regardless of the claims used to challenge quarantines like those in 
Connecticut and New Jersey, lawyers are more likely to force courts to account 
for the key facts about Ebola transmission if they feature those facts in their 
complaints and briefs. A review of the pleadings in the Connecticut and New 
Jersey cases reveal that they were largely silent on the unique progression of 
Ebola that explained why quarantine was irrational unless and until an exposed 
individual developed a fever.123 
Ten pleadings, including eight briefs, were submitted to district or appellate 
courts in the Connecticut and New Jersey cases arguing that each state’s 
quarantine of asymptomatic individuals during the Ebola scare was 
inappropriate and illegal.124 Of those ten pleadings only one included all of the 
key facts about Ebola transmission.125 Even that one brief did not address the 
several days of lag time between dry and wet symptoms, and it did not feature 
the key transmission facts by addressing them early in the brief, identifying all 
three facts in a single sentence starting at the bottom of page fifteen of that 
brief.126 Nor did this brief highlight the facts in an easy-to-understand, hard-to-
ignore context, such as comparing Ebola transmission to HIV transmission or 
including graphs or images that encapsulate or depict the facts. Rather, the brief 
states simply that “[a]symptomatic individuals cannot transmit the disease to 
 
 121. ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 116, at 598, 599. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See generally Verified Complaint, Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 578 (D.N.J. 2016) 
(No. 15-7647); Trial Pleading, Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-
00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017). 
 124. The relevant pleadings for Hickox v Christie in the federal district court for the District of 
New Jersey include the plaintiff’s complaint and her brief in opposition to the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss. The pleadings for Liberian Community Association of Connecticut v. Malloy include 
the plaintiffs’ complaint and brief in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss filed in the 
federal district court for the District of Connecticut as well as the plaintiffs’ opening and reply 
appellate briefs and four amicus briefs filed in the federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
The following three questions were addressed in the review of each of the briefs: (1) Does the brief 
state that Ebola is not transmitted by asymptomatic individuals? (2) Does the brief state that Ebola 
is not transmitted by individuals infected with Ebola who have dry symptoms such as fever? (3) 
Does the brief state that there is a lag time of several days between the onset of dry symptoms and 
wet symptoms? 
 125. Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on Behalf 
of Plaintiff, Kaci Hickox at 15–16, Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 578 (D.N.J. 2016) (No. 15-
7647). 
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others, and, critically, fever precedes the contagious stage.”127 Of the remaining 
seven briefs, only one other—an amicus brief—includes two of the key facts.128 
Advocates for rational quarantine increase the likelihood that the law will 
lose the key facts of Ebola transmission when those advocates fail to at least 
mention all of those facts in each of their pleadings. Of course, good advocacy 
may call for not only mentioning, but also highlighting these foundational facts. 
One sentence located fifteen pages into a brief is more easily missed by a judge 
than a sentence featured at the start of the brief and in brief headings. Indeed, 
this very Article begins with the three lost facts and uses an image to depict one 
of them. The reader should ask herself whether those facts are hard to ignore 
when featured in that way. 
To this point, the Article has examined ways that lawyers can help assure 
that courts do not lose sight of the key facts of Ebola transmission when 
reviewing a legal challenge to the quarantine of asymptomatic individuals. Yet, 
courts also bear responsibility to assure that those facts are discovered and 
accounted for. That responsibility is inherent in even the most deferential 
standard of judicial review.129 A court asked to address whether a public health 
agency has acted reasonably and without abusing its discretion need not simply 
defer to the expertise of the agency without requiring that the agency to identify 
and explain the logic the agency deployed to reach its conclusion that quarantine 
was appropriate. Additionally, a court is not failing to act with appropriate 
deference to the agency if the court requires the agency to explain how its 
determination about the risk posed by asymptomatic individuals exposed to 
Ebola is consistent with the best available medical and public health evidence 
about how the disease is transmitted from human-to-human. A court that does 
not make such a minimal inquiry is failing to assure that quarantine orders are 
“reasonable” whether or not lawyers for those quarantined adequately argue for 
such an inquiry.130 
In fact, a state trial court in Maine undertook such a minimal and nonetheless 
rigorous review when the State sought a temporary order to quarantine Kaci 
Hickox, a nurse and public health worker who returned to her home in Maine 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Brief for Amici Curiae Mark Barnes and Leana Wen in Support of Appellants at 5–6, 
Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048 (D. Conn. 
Mar. 30, 2017) (“As CDC and medical experts had publicly stated, asymptomatic individuals 
cannot spread the Ebola virus, while fever precedes the stage at which Ebola is contagious, such 
that an individual can be isolated well before becoming a threat to others.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 129. See supra notes 106–116 and accompanying text. 
 130. Several jurisdictions are aided by bench books designed to guide courts through legal 
decision-making related to public health. Public Health Law Bench Books, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/topic/benchbooks.html (last 
reviewed Oct. 31, 2018). A valuable future research question is whether those bench books instruct 
courts in cases challenging quarantine and isolation orders to make findings with respect to the 
modes of transmission for the particular infectious diseases at issue. 
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after returning to the U.S. from treating Ebola patients in West Africa in 2014.131 
The record contained only the state’s petition, which identified Ms. Hickox as 
one who was exposed to but was asymptomatic for Ebola.132 Nonetheless, the 
court, in carrying out its statutory duty to review the necessity of the order 
requested in the petition, identified a fundamental flaw in the state’s logic; 
namely, that the petition sought to quarantine Hickox while also admitting that 
Hickox was asymptomatic and that only those experiencing symptoms of Ebola 
can transmit the disease to others.133 As a result—and without any advocate 
arguing on behalf of Ms. Hickox—the court denied the petition to the extent that 
it sought an immediate quarantine.134 If a state trial court in Maine can carry out 
such an inquiry during a claimed emergency, including hearing from only one 
party in the dispute, then certainly two federal district courts should have been 
able to make a similar inquiry more than a year after the Ebola scare had ended—
regardless of any information provided or arguments made by advocates for the 
quarantined individuals. 
V.  CONCLUSION: RE-EXAMINING PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL PREPAREDNESS? 
The preceding parts demonstrate that lawyers and judges are not sufficiently 
prepared to deploy the law effectively even after a public health emergency, let 
alone during one. As a remedy, public health organizations, policy makers, and 
professional organizations for lawyers and judges, among others, must prioritize 
greater preparedness for public health crises. Specific steps should include: 
• identifying and training a corps of lawyers in all fifty states who agree, on 
an emergency basis, to represent individuals subject to state public health 
orders during a disease epidemic or other population health scare; 
• develop a legal go-team, perhaps through the CDC, that would support 
state and local public health officials during a public health scare; 
• publish guides for lawyers identifying and comparing various claims that 
could be relevant in the representation of persons subject to public health 
orders during an emergency; and 
• offer table-top public health exercises for judges and lawyers. 
These strategies, at least in theory, fit under the concept of public health 
legal preparedness. As a practical matter, however, doing so will require a 
reconsideration of the concept. 
 
 131. Gatter, supra note 11, at 376. 
 132. Verified Petition for Public Health Order at 2, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 (Me. 
Dist. Ct., Fort Kent, Oct. 30, 2014). 
 133. Order Pending Hearing, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 (Me. Dist. Ct., Fort Kent, 
Oct. 31, 2014). 
 134. See id. 
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Public health legal preparedness is defined as “legal benchmarks essential 
to the preparedness of the public health system” to respond effectively to an 
emergency.135 These legal benchmarks and standards fall into four categories: 
“laws and legal authorities,”136 “competency in using laws effectively and 
wisely,”137 “coordination of legally based interventions across jurisdictions and 
sectors,” and “information on public health laws and best practices.”138 The 
concept emerged after September 11, 2001, and its practical focus has been on 
assuring that the legal authority of public health agencies is clear and that 
officials are trained on that authority in anticipation of a public health 
emergency. 
The traditional focus on preparing public health officials for the legal 
challenges of responding to a public health emergency is necessary but 
insufficient. It is time to expand public health legal preparedness to prepare the 
lawyers and judges who must make important legal and factual judgments 
effectively and quickly during an emergency. This must include preparing them 
to deploy law in the context of fear and even panic. 
  
 
 135. Anthony D. Moulton et al., What Is Public Health Legal Preparedness?, 31 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 672, 674 (2003). 
 136. Described as the “statutes, regulations, ordinances, court rulings, and other authoritative 
statements by government bodies” that “are foundational to public health legal preparedness.” 
Georges C. Benjamin & Anthony D. Moulton, Public Health Legal Preparedness: A Framework 
for Action, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 13, 14 (2008). 
 137. This component of public health legal preparedness demands that “[p]ublic health 
professionals . . . know the legal powers they have and how best to apply them.” Id. Additionally, 
it requires that “emergency responders, law enforcement officials, judges, hospital managers, and 
many others knowing the legal authorities held by public health officials as well as their own 
relevant legal powers and imitations.” Id. 
 138. “Information resources . . . include, for example, practitioner guides to the established 
public health laws of a given jurisdiction, updates on relevant new laws and court rulings, and 
science- or experience-based best practices in using laws to support public health interventions.” 
Id. 
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